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 1
 There is no real agreement as to what would be a proper division of the 
[international] tax base, nor is there any obvious principle of fairness that 
can be invoked to justify any particular distribution of revenue. The 
present division has been a more or less accidental result of the attempt to 
eliminate double taxation, and is principally a product of the various 
model double taxation treaties that have been adopted over a period of 
some 60 years. Since the principal architects of these model treaties have 
been the major capital-exporting countries, it seems reasonable to suppose 
that, to the extent that the existing arrangements are inequitable, they 
operate to the prejudice of countries that are primarily importers of 
capital … and as the great majority of lesser-developed countries fall into 
this category, there is the further consideration that some redistribution in 
favour of source countries would on balance be desirable and would 
promote a form of vertical equity among nations. 
 
--- Alex Easson (1991)1 
 
 
The current international tax system allocates the taxation of cross-border income by 
reference to the residence of the taxpayer and/or the source of income. The governing 
rules are contained in domestic tax laws and bilateral tax treaties. As noted by Professor 
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Easson, the current regime of allocation is not based on any real agreement between 
nations and cannot be rationalized by any “obvious principle of fairness”.  In fact, it is 
biased in favour of the capital exporting nations that devised the rules of the game.  In 
order to improve fairness, Professor Easson considered it desirable to have some 
“redistribution” in favour of less developed, net capital-importing nations.  Professor 
Easson was one of few legal scholars2 that have emphasized the importance of inter-
nation equity.  International tax literature has recently been preoccupied with efficiency 
and welfare maximization,3 predominantly from a one-country perspective.4    
 
This paper joins Professor Easson in his pursuit of inter-nation equity. The main 
argument is that inter-nation equity in the sense of fair allocation of tax base as well as 
international redistribution should be taken seriously in future tax reforms.  It 
demonstrates, at a conceptual level, that inter-nation equity can be improved through 
adopting a territorial system of taxing business income and redesigning the tax sparing 
system. The main goal of this paper is to tease out the conceptual challenge of identifying 
inter-nation equity without suggesting any specific mechanism or process by which it 
might conceivably be resolved.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Part I provides a brief overview of the concept inter-
nation equity (INE) in terms of allocation of international tax base and a modest element 
of redistribution of tax base between nations. Part II makes the case for taking inter-
nation equity seriously in current international tax reforms.  Part III demonstrates that a 
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territorial system of taxing business profit is more equitable in sharing the tax base 
between the source country and the residence country of the capital-owner. It also 
demonstrates that the well-designed tax sparing system can function as a meaningful 
redistribution system between countries.  The paper ends with some general conclusions.   
 
 
I.  INTER-NATION EQUITY 
 
A. The Concept 
 
Peggy Musgrave adopted the term “inter-nation equity” in her work published in the 
1960s. In United States Taxation of Foreign Investment Income (1969)5 she writes that 
“international revenue sharing, as an aspect of the taxation of foreign investment, is a 
matter of inter-nation equity”, and that “[a]lthough this problem is of little interest to the 
private investor, it is a major concern of the countries involved…”6  Over the years, inter-
nation equity has been variously described by Peggy and/or Richard Musgrave as an 
“equitable division of the tax revenue between countries,”7 “the problem of tax shares in 
international business,”8 and an equitable “allocation of national gain and loss.”9  
 
Legal scholars have phrased inter-nation equity to be the “distribution among countries of 
the competence to tax”.10 “A major goal of international tax rules should be to provide 
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each country of the world with a fair share of the tax revenues available from income 
generated by transnational activities of domestic and foreign taxpayers.”11 
 
As such, inter-nation equity differs from the other, and better known, notion of “equity” – 
inter-individual equity based on the ability to pay principle. Inter-individual equity is 
concerned with the sharing of the tax burden among taxpayers in a country (which can be 
understood as “intra-nation equity”), whereas inter-nation equity is an international 
problem and is concerned with the sharing of the tax base between nations. Inter-nation 
equity is also different from international neutrality (capital-import neutrality or capital 
export neutrality) or international efficiency. International tax neutrality toward 
investment may be defined “as a situation in which the pattern of taxation does not 
interfere with or affect the taxpayer’s choice between investing at home and investing in 
foreign countries.”12 It is “called for in the interests of world efficiency in resource 
allocation.”13 Leaving patriotism aside, taxpayers are directly affected by inter-individual 
equity and international neutrality, but not inter-nation equity.   
 
B. Tax Entitlement and Allocation of International Tax Base  
 
According to Peggy Musgrave, the notion of “national entitlements” is the basis for inter-
nation equity.  In her early work, Musgrave regarded inter-nation equity between the 
home and host countries in terms of an equitable division of national gain and loss.14 A 
taxpayer’s income from foreign investment is part of the home country’s national gain 
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because the home country has an initial interest in all of its taxpayers’ capital and 
incomes. An income tax imposed by a host country thus results in a national loss to the 
home country. Whether the home country also experiences a loss of revenue or “treasury 
loss” depends on the method used by it to prevent double taxation. If the home country 
uses the exemption method or credit method, the host country’s tax diminishes the home 
country’s treasury, thus resulting in a “national loss”. The home country’s national loss is 
a national gain to the host country.  Musgrave’s recent work focuses more on the tax 
entitlement of both the residence country and source country and the notion of 
sovereignty.15  
 
In discussing the tax entitlement of the residence country, Musgrave states that “countries 
will wish to retain a degree of sovereignty over the tax treatment of the income-earning 
activities abroad of their residents.”16 She advances several principles in support of the 
residence country’s tax entitlements. One is economic allegiance: “residents are held to 
owe tax allegiance in return for the rights and privileges that they receive as residents”. 
Another is the ability-to-pay principle: “exercise of tax sovereignty over foreign source 
income is also necessary to achieve equitable tax treatment of resident taxpayers by 
making all income, wherever earned, subject to tax, consistent with the accretion 
principle.”17 The third is the benefit principle: “as a payment for productivity-enhancing 
benefits provided by the country of residence to its own factors of production prior to 
transfer abroad and for the rights and privileges afforded the corporation by its country of 
registration.”18 National interest may also be relevant in determining whether outflow of 
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capital should be encouraged or discouraged. Ultimately, the residence country’s tax 
entitlement is only residual. However, as a residual taxing authority, the residence 
country has control over the total tax burden of the foreign-source income of its resident 
taxpayers. An exemption system would leave the foreign income taxed solely by the 
source country, whereas a credit system may result in some tax payable to the residence 
country if the foreign tax is lower. In the absence of cooperation the principal 
consideration in making the choice are equitable.  
 
Source countries are entitled to tax income arising within their borders, including that 
accruing to foreign investors. Musgrave regards this entitlement to tax at source as “the 
bedrock of most international tax treaties.”19 A country is permitted “to share in the gains 
of foreign-owned factors of production operating within its borders, gains that are 
generated in cooperation with its own inputs, whether they be natural resources, an 
educated or low-cost workforce, or proximity to a market.”20 She rationalizes the source 
country’s entitlements on the basis of “economic rent” –the source country’s tax “may be 
thought of as a national return to the leasing of these complementary factors to 
nonresident investors or temporary workers.” She also thinks of source country tax in 
benefit terms, as a quid pro quo payment for cost-reducing, profit-enhancing services 
provided by the source country.”21   
 
Musgrave’s formulation of inter-nation equity suggests that source entitlement and 
residence entitlement stand on equal footing. Any inter-nation tax conflicts should be 
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resolved through international coordination, as opposed to tax competition. Her primary 
issue in inter-nation equity is the source country’s share in international income arising 
within its borders.  
 
C. Inter-nation Redistribution  
 
The notion of inter-nation equity emphasizes fair allocation of tax base among countries. 
The Musgraves did raise a concern about distributional consequences: “[w]ith a highly 
unequal distribution of resource endowments and per capita income among countries and 
in the absence of an adequate method for dealing with the problem, an appropriate pattern 
of tax-imposed national gains and losses might be used to secure some degree of 
adjustment.”22 They suggested a mechanism for redistributing wealth internationally – an 
internationally agreed rate schedule for corporate tax and withholding tax wherein tax 
rates would relate inversely to per capita income in the source country and directly to per 
capita income in the residence country.23   
 
The Musgraves did not provide any theoretical foundation for inter-nation redistribution. 
In recent years, John Rawls’s theory of justice has been applied to inter-nation 
distributive justice, in spite of Rawls’ own reticence in this regard. Rawls’ central 
argument for domestic distributive justice is that individuals should not be disadvantaged 
on account of arbitrary factors such as their social class, natural endowment, and 
misfortune.24 Global egalitarians have argued that neither should individuals be at a 
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disadvantage due to an accidental fact like their country of birth.25  If distributive justice 
is motivated by the need to mitigate the effects of contingencies that are “arbitrary from a 
moral point of view” on people’s life chances, this presents a consideration also for 
global distributive justice.26  Some legal scholars recognize that globalization has 
increased the need for inter-nation redistribution27 and argue that there appears to be no 
sound theoretical reason to restrict redistribution to members of any single tax 
jurisdiction.28  Others argue, however, that effective redistribution needs a world 
government.29 In the absence of such world government, 30 a systematic redistribution is 
unlikely. Nonetheless, redistribution between nations is becoming an increasingly 
important concern and the tax system has a role to play. 
 
 
II. WHY SHOULD EQUITY BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY NOW? 
 
Inter-nation equity in terms of allocating the international base in accordance with the tax 
entitlements of each country and re-distributing national income in accordance with 
distributive justice should be taken seriously in international tax reforms for two main 
reasons. One, it provides an important, and perhaps superior, policy framework than the 
principle of neutralities to guide future reforms.  Second, the inequities in the 
international tax system are difficult to justify, let alone, perpetuate, in the age of 
globalization. Inter-nation equity provides a rationale and goal for reforms to reduce such 
inequities. The beginning of a new millennium is the right to act. 
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A.   Important Policy Criteria 
 
Tax equity has been an important policy objective in domestic income tax policy. 
However, recent proposals to reform international tax system in Canada, New Zealand, 
United Kingdom, and United States31 have focused on economic efficiency, almost to the 
exclusion of all other values, as a criterion for international tax policy.32  For example, 
the Advisory Panel of Canada’s System of International Taxation recently published a 
consultation paper -- Enhancing Canada’s International Tax Advantage33  identifies the 
policy framework to include attracting foreign investment, competitiveness, simplicity, 
and fairness. It recognizes the theories of capital export neutrality (CEN), capital import 
neutrality (CIN) and capital ownership neutrality (CON) may influence the choice 
between an exemption system and a foreign tax credit system. Indeed, the  
Advisory Panel expressed a preference for the exemption system over the credit system, 
mainly on ground of CIN and CON.34  The recent debates about the exemption or credit 
system of taxing foreign business profits have been described as the “Battle of the 
Neutralities.”35  
 
Relying on CEN, CIN and CON as guiding principles for international tax policy suffers 
several shortcomings: 
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(1) As recognized by the Panel, “fulfilling the three neutrality standards with a single 
set of tax rules is impossible.”36 Either a credit system or an exemption system 
violates at least one of the principles.  
(2) The conflicts between CEN and CIN/CON cannot be reconciled in the absence of 
harmonization of every country’s tax rates. The Carter Commission argues that 
neutrality requires tax harmonization between nations so that each individual is 
unaffected, from a tax viewpoint, by citizenship, residence, and the locations of 
property, business, and employment.37 Of course, such harmonization is possible 
only if all countries provide the same public expenditures mix, finance with the 
same taxes at the same rates, and adjust the taxes simultaneously. Since one of 
such criteria is unlikely to be met in practice, international neutrality cannot be 
achieved. Even if tax harmonization were possible, the Commission notes that tax 
revenues must still be allocated between source and destination countries, and in a 
world of other distortions international neutrality may not be a sensible goal.38  
(3) There are disagreements as to what is needed to satisfy CIN or CEN. Traditionally, 
CEN is considered satisfied by the accrual taxation or deferral plus credit 
system,39 and CIN is satisfied by the exemption system. Recently, some scholars 
argue that exclusive source-based taxation (or territorial taxation) “seems to be a 
theoretically, practically, and politically superior means for achieving CEN.”40 
(4) The practical implications of CIN and CEN are not as significant as they appear. 
OECD countries generally impose some sort of accrual taxation of foreign 
portfolio income (similar to the Canadian FAPI system). The apparent difference 
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between deferral plus credit system (CEN-based) and the exemption system (CIN 
based) results in little real difference if foreign business income earned through a 
foreign corporation is not repatriated (that is, if the deferral lasts long enough). In 
certain circumstances, because of the time value of money, the credit system 
produces tax results that are better than the exemption system.41  
 
Therefore, the neutrality principles justify almost any proposal of reform:  “[E]very 
traditional discussion concludes by asserting that whatever policy is being proposed 
represent a fair balance between those two irreconcilable objectives [CIN and CEN], in 
every case based largely on the author’s preexisting intentions.”42  It is time to take INE 
seriously. Compared to the neutrality principles, the ability-to-pay and tax entitlement 
principles that underlie inter-nation equity are more coherent internally and offer a 
rational framework for the debate.  For example, the ability-to-pay principle has been 
accepted as a guiding principle in the development of personal income taxation, even 
though the level of progressivity may have been controversial. Furthermore, tax 
entitlement (although a much less debated issue in tax literature) has formed the bedrock 
of the current tax treaty network.43 At a minimum, the ability-to-pay principle and tax 
entitlement principle should be considered.   
 
B.  Equity as a Benchmark for Reducing International Tax Inequities  
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The unfairness and inequities in the current international tax system have been well 
identified in literature. For example, Easson noted that tax treaty rules have been 
developed by major capital-exporting countries and operate to the prejudice of 
developing countries.44  Inter-nation equity can function as a benchmark for measuring 
inequities as well as a goal for reforms.  
 
The bias against capital-importing countries is evident in the history of the world’s tax 
treaties.45 Current tax treaties are based on the model tax conventions developed by the 
OECD and the UN to a lesser extent.  These treaties were originally developed primarily 
to eliminate double taxation in order to facilitate cross-border trade and investment.  The 
elimination of double taxation is achieved mainly through restrictions on source taxation. 
Treaty rules have the appearance of fairness because they are “reciprocal”. However, as 
between a developing and a developed country, such reciprocity exists only in name, 
because the developing country is a net-capital importing country. As such, any limitation 
on source taxation reduces its tax base.46  In the case of business income and income 
from real estate where the tax entitlement of a source country is overwhelmingly strong, 
inter-nation equity would require exclusive taxation of such income in the source country.  
 
As noted by Peggy Musgrave that some redistribution of income between countries is 
necessary in order to reduce the inequity resulted from allocating international tax based 
in accordance with the tax entitlements because of the unequal natural endowments of 
resources, etc. The need for such international redistribution is increasing because the 
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income gap between high-income and low-income countries has been increasing.  
International inequity is evidenced by the fact that 23% of the world’s inhabitants absorb 
a whopping 82% of the world’s wealth as measured by gross domestic products (GDP), 
leaving 77% of the world to divide the remaining 18%.47  Such inequity “dwarfs into 
relative insignificance” the domestic distributive problem.48  Since income tax has been 
used as an effective instrument for redistributing income at a national level through 
progressive taxation and various social tax expenditures, international income tax policy 
could be used as a distributive instrument, albeit at a modest level.  Tax treaties are 
currently capable of redistributing the tax base whereby a high-income (residence) 
country “transfers” its jurisdiction to tax to the low-income (source) country (such as 
high withholding tax rates for investment income) or grants a tax sparing.  
   
 C. Opportune Time  
 
The wheels of international tax reform churn slowly. At the beginning of the new 
millennium, there appear to be forces that may speed up the reform. One force is the 
increasing influence of the OECD as a de facto world tax organization.49 The OECD can 
play a significant role in coordinating the domestic tax policies of its member countries. 
Its influence goes far beyond its membership. Through providing technical assistance to 
non-member countries (such as China), maintaining and updating the OECD Model and 
Commentaries, developing transfer pricing guidelines, and publishing policy papers, the 
OECD exerts a great deal of influence on the tax policies of non-member countries. 
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Should the OECD recognize the importance of inter-nation equity, it can mobilize forces 
to do something about it.  
 
Another force for change is domestic reforms. Major reform initiatives in Canada and 
other OECD countries are likely to shift the system of taxing foreign business profits 
towards an exemption or territorial system. As discussed below, such shift should have 
positive implications for inter-nation equity. Recent developments in corporate tax in the 
EU suggest that equity and fairness in sharing the international corporate tax base is 
being taken seriously.50 The outcome of the EU reforms may suggest technical solutions.  
Tax reforms in low-income capital importing countries, such as China, have also 
demonstrated a maturity in their international tax policy. For example, as of January 1, 
2008, China abolished tax incentives that were designed in the 1980s and 1990s to attract 
FDI and replaced them with general lower rates and tax incentives designed to promote 
sustainable economic development.51 The new Chinese tax law also emphasizes the 
protection of the tax base through specific and general anti-avoidance rules (including 
transfer pricing and thin capitalization) as well as defining the Chinese source of income 
on the basis of the economic activities to reflect the Chinese view of tax entitlement.   
 
There is also an emerging body of tax scholarship on inter-nation equity.52 Tax scholars 
have studied and applied the principle of inter-nation to the analysis of international tax 
problems, such as the taxation of corporate income,53  tax jurisdiction,54 tax sparing,55 
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and redistribution across borders.56  It is possible that some of the academic insights are 
translated into reforms in domestic and or treaty law to achieve more equity. 
 
III. TAX REFORMS TOWARDS INTER-NATION EQUITY 
 
A. The role of high-income countries  
 
Any improvement in inter-nation equity must be initiated and supported by capital-
exporting countries because they have the obligation and capability.  There is a growing 
awareness that the North-South divide “lies at the heart of the rich world’s current 
troubles, including terrorism, immigration pressures, and environmental threats”.57 These 
global problems cannot be resolved by the South alone. Members of the United Nations 
have unanimously agreed that the inequities must be addressed internationally and 
pledged themselves to achieve the “Millennium Development Goals” by 2015.58  
Although developed countries have not fulfilled their obligations, there is no denying that 
there is a recognition of the need for global justice and the intention of doing something 
about it. Ultimately, reducing inequity serves the interest of developed countries as well.   
Many developed countries are sympathetic to the claim for more source-based taxation 
by developing countries and have adopted the provisions of the UN Model Convention at 
various degrees, including tax sparing.     
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Low-income countries have not played any meaningful role in developing the current 
international tax system. They do not have an institution, such as the OECD, that can 
effectively represent their tax interests.  The United Nations has not functioned as a world 
tax organization in any sense. Moreover, low-income countries have been competing 
with each other in offering tax incentives to FDI,59  even if the effectiveness and 
efficiency of many tax incentives are doubtful. It seems difficult for these countries, as a 
group, to end the “race-to-the-bottom” type of tax competition on their own. The 
OECD’s initiative on harmful tax competition, although motivated mostly out of self-
interest of its member countries, seems to have encouraged some tax haven countries to 
cooperate with OECD member countries.60   
    
In terms of actually implementing any change of reform, only developed countries have 
the capacity. As mentioned already, the OECD is the closest thing we have as an 
“international tax organization”.61 OECD Member countries that provide homes for about 
three quarters of the world’s multinational enterprises and whose citizens account for 
well over half of the world income and wealth - The “rich holds the key to taxation 
reform.”62  
 
B. Territorial Taxation of Business Income   
 
The current system of international taxation recognizes the tax entitlement of the source 
country in respect of business profits derived from activities carried on in that country. 
 17
Foreign business profits earned directly by a domestic corporation are taxable in the 
source country under bilateral treaties to the extent that they are attributable to a 
permanent establishment in the source country.63 Whether such profits are taxed again in 
the residence country depends on that country’s domestic tax law. In “credit” countries 
(e.g., Australia, Canada, Japan, UK, and US), the profits are taxable, subject to a foreign 
tax credit for the source country’s tax.64  In “exempt” countries (mostly continental 
European countries), such profits are exempt from domestic taxation. As a result, the only 
difference between the credit system and the exempt system is whether the residence 
claims “residual” taxation over the foreign business profits.  Therefore, if the residence 
country adopts the credit system and limits the credit to the amount of domestic tax 
otherwise payable, it implicitly allows the source country to tax income at the “soak-up” 
rate (i.e., a rate that is equal to that in the residence country). If the residence country 
adopts the exemption system, it gives the source country exclusive jurisdiction to tax.   
 
Where foreign business profits are earned through a foreign corporation owned by 
domestic residents, such profits are taxable solely in the source country. The residence 
country of the shareholder does not tax such profits on a current basis, irrespective of it is 
a credit country or an exempt country. However, when the profits are repatriated to the 
shareholders by way of a dividend, the taxation of the dividend differs between a credit 
country and an exempt country. The former would tax the dividends, subject to a direct 
and indirect foreign tax credit for the foreign dividend withholding tax and underlying 
corporate income tax. The latter would exempt the dividends from domestic taxation.  
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Canada has a hybrid credit and exemption system: the latter applies on to business profits 
earned in a treaty country.  However, the “credit” or “exempt” treatment is limited to the 
corporate shareholder of the foreign corporation. When the domestic parent corporation 
distributes the dividends received from its foreign subsidiary to individual shareholders, 
the dividends are generally taxable under personal income tax. In this sense, both credit 
and exempt countries “share” the taxation of business profits, albeit on a deferred basis, 
by taxing the individual shareholders on the repatriated profits.  
 
The exempt system is gaining support in economic literature and many international tax 
reform recommendations in Australia, Canada, New Zealand,  United Kingdom,  and the 
United States. In principle, the exemption system allows business profits to be subject to 
territorial taxation. Territorial taxation is consistent with the tax entitlement theory and 
promotes inter-nation equity. Business profits earned in the source country are taxed 
exclusively at source at the corporate level, and again at the individual shareholder level 
in the residence country. Assuming that the source rules and allocation rules are 
“scientifically” designed to reflect the economic origin of business profits, the countries 
that are entitled to tax such profits (i.e., the source country and the residence country of 
the individual investor) share the taxation of business profits.   
 
One drawback of territorial tax system is the risk of encouraging tax competition among 
source countries because the level of corporate-level tax would be exclusively determined 
by the source country.65  The territorial system allows the foreign investor to directly 
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benefit from the tax incentives granted by a source country, whereas a credit system 
would “cancel” the benefits of tax incentives by taxing the business profits in the absence 
of a tax sparing credit. 
 
While territorial taxation of business profits promotes inter-nation equity, the same 
cannot be said with territorial taxation of investment income.66  The tax entitlement 
claims of the source country over investment income are not nearly as strong as over 
business income. The residence country of the investor has, in fact, a much stronger 
claim. The goal of inter-nation equity is met if the residence country has the dominant, if 
not exclusive, tax claim over international portfolio income. As such, the Canadian FAPI 
regime, the U.S. Subpart F regime, and similar anti-deferral or imputation system of 
taxing foreign passive income earned by controlled foreign corporations do not violate 
inter-nation equity.67 
     
C. Tax Sparing as a mechanism of International Redistribution  
 
A tax sparing credit is, in essence, a credit for foreign taxes deemed paid for the purposes 
of claiming foreign tax credit by the taxpayer in the residence country. Naturally, it is 
relevant only when the residence country adopts the credit system of taxing foreign 
income. If the residence country adopts the territorial system of taxation for business 
profits, the tax sparing credit would be relevant only in the case of international portfolio 
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income. Otherwise, it would be relevant in case of both foreign business income and 
portfolio income.  
 
The country that grants a tax sparing credit recognizes the tax entitlement of the source 
country and supports the use of tax incentives by foregoing its residual tax claim over the 
income that was exempt from tax in the source country. In other words, this is a cross-
border tax subsidy, that explicitly benefits the taxpayer who invests in the source country, 
but implicitly benefits the source country by “subsidizing” the investment.  Because a tax 
sparing credit is generally given by a high-income capital exporting country to a low-
income capital importing country through treaty negotiations, it can be viewed as   
international redistribution mechanism.  
 
There have been significant debates about the merits of tax sparing credits. Among the 
many criticisms of this mechanism are the lack of transparency and accountability, 
potential for abuse, and lack of a sun-set clause. 68 However, these criticisms seem to 
point to technical design issues, not the theoretical rationale. Until an explicit 
international redistribution system is established, abolishing tax sparing would remove 
the only mechanism we have of international redistribution.69    
 
Instead of abolishing it, capital-exporting countries should re-design the tax sparing 
mechanism to effectively deliver aid to “worthy” countries in respect of “worthy” 
investment activities.70  For example, tax sparing can be targeted at the incentives used to 
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“jump start” an economy in the form of FDI or the transfer of technology. Such 
mechanism would be an effective way of assisting the developing country without unduly 
“encouraging” harmful tax competition.   
    
CONCLUSIONS  
 
A number of conclusions can be drawn on the basis of the discussions in this paper. First, 
inter-nation equity in the sense of fair sharing of the international tax base has been the 
foundation of the current international tax system, but there are significant inequities 
towards net capital-importing countries.  Intern-nation equity in the sense of 
redistribution between nations has not been taken seriously.  Second, inter-nation equity 
deals with the sharing of the international tax base between countries, and does not, in 
theory, adversely affect the allocation of resources or investors’ behaviour.  There 
appears to be no sound reasons to regard world efficiency and world equity as mutually 
exclusive.  Third, in the age of globalization, there are many international problems that 
can be effectively addressed only by international efforts. As part of the international 
legal system, the tax system has a role to play. High-income countries have the means 
and obligation to affect changes to the international tax system in order to achieve equity. 
Adopting territorial system of taxation and effective tax sparing credits are possible 
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